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Intrinsic value (animal ethics)
The intrinsic value of an animal refers to the value it possesses in its own right, as an end-in-itself, as opposed to its instrumental value, its value to other animals (including human beings). The phrase (often used synonymously with ''inherent value'') has been adopted by animal rights advocates. The Dutch ''Animal Health and Welfare Act'' referred to it in 1981: "Acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of animals means that animals have value in their own right and as a consequence their interests are no longer automatically subordinate to man's interests."〔Cock Buning, Tj. (2006). "Empirisch onderzoek naar morele oordeelsvorming bij genetische modificatie van dieren," ''NVBE Nieuwsbrief'', 13,3, 10–12.〕 This acknowledgement has stirred a debate on what it entails in the context of animal husbandry, animal breeding, vivisection, animal testing and biotechnology.
== History of the moral status of animals (1880–1980) ==
Moral attitudes towards animals in the west (as expressed in public debate and legislation) have changed considerably over time. Until the 2nd half of the 20th century, the use of animals was regulated by prohibiting those activities that were regarded as offensive to humans (the so-called Offence principle) or at odds with human dignity. These regulations were anthropocentric in character: their objective was to protect the moral feelings and values of human individuals. Other forms of legislation concerning animals sprang from agricultural, economical and veterinary motives.
During the second half of the 20th century, the intensification of cattle breeding and the increased use of laboratory animals provoked fierce debates in which the negative consequences for the animals themselves became an issue. Notably during the 1960s and 1970s, pressure groups started to argue on behalf of the interests of animals kept in laboratories and farms. They expressed their discontent with laws that prohibited deliberate cruelty to animals only insofar as feelings of human individuals were offended or the cruelty involved could be regarded as a defamation on human dignity. They called for new forms of legislation that would protect animals for non-anthropocentric reasons.
In these discussions (the moral relevance of the animal's welfare) two key issues were involved. To begin with, the Harm principle, rather than the Offence principle, should be the moral foundation for the protection of animals. Secondly, as to the scepticism expressed by scientists regarding the presence of consciousness and self-awareness in animals, they should be granted the benefit of the doubt by adopting the so-called ''analogy postulate''. Applied ethological research into the behaviour of animals in captivity made it clear that the intensive use of animals had negative effects on the animal's health and well-being. Nevertheless, concern for the well-being of animals had to be purged from anthropomorphism and sentimentalism. This point of view is taken for example in a report by the Dutch Federation of Veterinarians in the EEC (FVE, 1978) concerning welfare-problems among domestic animals. This document states that:
although the interests of animals often conflict with the demands of society, society remains responsible for the welfare of the animals involved. Considerations regarding animal welfare ought to be based on veterinary, scientific and ethological norms, but not on sentiment. And although animals do not have fundamental rights, human beings have certain moral obligations towards them.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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